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Abstract 
 
Business process understanding and modelling is one of the major aspects in the modern 
information system (IS) development. Thus, there exist several modelling approaches to 
support this activity, and one on them is the business process modelling notations (BPMN). 
Although BPMN is a good approach to understand business processes, there is a limited work 
to understand how this language could deal with business security and security risk 
management for IS. This is a problem, since both business processes and security concerns 
should be understood in parallel to support a development of the secure IS. In this paper we 
analyse BPMN with respect to the domain model of the IS security risk management 
(ISSRM).  We apply a structured approach to understand key aspects of BPMN and how 
modeller could express secured assets, risks and risk treatment using BPMN. Thus we align 
the main constructs of the BPMN language with the key concepts of the ISSRM domain 
model. We show applicability of our approach on a running example related to the Internet 
store. We believe that our proposal would allow system analysts to understand both business 
processes and security concerns using the same modelling language (thus, removing the 
necessity of learning several modelling languages). In addition we open a possibility for the 
business and security model interoperability and the model transformation between several 
modelling approaches (if these both are aligned to the ISSRM domain model). 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation  
Security is a major aspect of Information System development that affects each component of 
the system very closely. We can claim that the process of security integration into the 
information systems is not completely and appropriately understood, otherwise there won’t 
exist a necessity in analysing and designing new methodologies and tools. The concept of 
security itself refers to the capability of a product, information system in our case, to protect 
information and data in order to avoid the accessibility of it by unauthorized persons or 
systems that are able to read or modify it. One of the important component of IS development 
is Business process understanding and modelling. It helps us effectively analysing the needs 
of providing software and services that become considerable and practical for the demands of 
any kind of business nowadays. So the actual challenge remains to create business processes 
with respect to security of the system being described. 
1.2 Scope 
The great variety of business process modelling approaches was developed in order to 
optimize business processes and to meet its business goals. Some of them are EPC, YAWL, 
and UML activity diagrams. The short description of each is presented below. 
An Event-driven Process Chain (EPC) is a type of flowchart that is used for business process 
improvement and also for laying out business process work flows, originally in conjunction 
with SAP R/3 modelling. The EPC is a base of the ARIS-framework and combines the 
different views towards the description of enterprises and information systems in the control 
view on the conceptual level (Seel et.al, 2005).  
Another representative of the business process modelling tools is YAWL, Yet Another 
Workflow Language, which is java-based open-source workflow system. Funded on a 
concise and powerful modelling language, YAWL is able to support complex data, 
integration with organizational resources and external applications, process verification and 
process configuration. It has open interfaces based on Web standards that enable to plug-in 
existing applications and to extend the system. It also provides a graphical editor with built-in 
verification functionality that helps to detect errors automatically on early stages (Aalst et.al, 
2005). 
The most common and typical tool for business process modelling is UML activity diagrams. 
The standardized general-purpose modelling language, UML, uses activity diagrams to model 
the workflow behind the system being designed. An activity diagram is a flowchart which 
shows the flow of control between the sequential activities of a process (Börger et.al, 2000). 
For this analytical work we choose quite young modelling notation BPMN, which is 
becoming a standard that has been developed by Business Process Management Initiative in 
year 2004 (White, 2004). Although the BPMN, which stands for Business Process Modelling 
Notation, is a comparatively new methodology, it gained a respectable place among the 
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business process modelling languages. Because BPMN is a standard and thanks to it’s 
similarity to flowcharting notations, it is friendly and familiar to business users. Each shape 
has a defined meaning, confined with rules that precisely dictate what can be connected to 
what. That means diagrams that you create will be completely understandable to other users 
from any business companies. Moreover, BPMN specifies the technical details that can be 
attached to any shape, details that make the model executive as an automated workflow. 
Nowadays BPMN provides language that describes process behaviour, shareable by business 
and IT; “We’ve never had that before” (Silver, 2009). 
1.3 Problem description 
Although BPMN is a good approach to understand business processes, there is a limited work 
to understand how this language could deal with business security and security risk 
management for IS. This is a problem, since both business processes and security concerns 
should be understood in parallel to support a development of the secure IS. There exist 
several attempts (e.g. (Rodriguez et.al, 2007)) to understand how security could be modelled, 
but the means to express security with BPMN is not yet understood.  
1.4 Purpose and research question 
In our thesis we investigate how BPMN could be used to determine the security risks. More 
specifically we analyse this approach with respect to the domain model of the information 
systems security risk management (ISSRM).  Our analysis allows us to determine the BPMN 
constructs which could be used to express secure business and IS assets, their risks and 
security requirements to mitigate these risks. 
1.5 Short overview of contribution 
During the analysis we apply a structures approach to understand key aspects of BPMN and 
how modeller could express secured assets, risks and risk treatment using BPMN. Thus in 
this way we align the main constructs of the BPMN language with the key concepts of the 
ISSRM domain model. In addition we extend BPMN with the principles to model and 
manage security risks. We show applicability of our approach on few illustrate examples 
(e.g., Internet store). We believe that our proposal will allow system analysts to understand 
both business processes and security concerns using the same modelling language (thus 
removing the necessity of learning several modelling languages). In addition we open the 
possibility for the business and security model interoperability and the model transformation 
between several modelling approaches (if these are also considered using the ISSRM domain 
model). 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Current work consists of five logical parts, divided into 10 chapters. Chapter 1 is 
introductive, it makes a short overview of a thesis, scope of our work, problem domain. 
Chapters 2 and 3 is a background of a thesis; it consist of description of Information System 
Security Risk Management, or ISSRM, and the second is dedicated to Business process 
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modelling notation or BPMN, which is taken as a base for current work. In Chapter 4 we 
make an analysis of adopting the BPMN to ISSRM, using the running example. Chapter 5 is 
mapping and summarizing of the result in one Table for better view. Chapter 6 represents 
problems that we faced with during the modelling of the example with a focus to security, 
and some improvements’ proposals. 
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Chapter 2. Information System Security Risk Management 
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) is practitioner-oriented 
methodological tool that helps organizations make decisions related to the security of 
Information Systems (Dubois et al., 2010). Today there exists hundreds of ISSRM methods 
and standards, which mainly consist of process guidelines to identify vulnerable assets, 
determine security objects, risks, define and implement security requirements for risk 
treatment. 
2.1 Scope and basic definitions 
The ISSRM approach used in this work focuses on security risk management. The goal of 
using the ISSRM approach is to protect organization’s assets. Asset is defined as anything 
that has value to the organization, and has a need in protection. Assets, related to the 
organization information system, such as people, machines, processes, data, software and 
similar will be taken into account as well. All the risks that threaten to above-mentioned 
subjects have to be evaluated with respect to three main properties: confidentiality – means 
that information can’t be or become available to any unauthorized individuals or processes, 
integrity – the property of protection the accuracy and completeness of secure assets, 
availability – corresponds for accessibility in usage upon demand of authorized individual or 
entity. Other criteria like accountability, authenticity can be added according to the context 
requirements. 
2.2 Domain model 
The domain model shown in Figure 1 consists of a conceptual model that puts together main 
ISSRM concepts, their relationships, and corresponding definitions. The model characterizes 
three principal groups of concepts: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk 
treatment-related concepts: marked correspondingly as blue, orange and green (Matulevičius 
et al., 2008a). 
The asset-related concepts describe the important assets that need to be protected. The asset 
generalizes two more concepts: the business asset, which is defined as information, process, 
skill inherent to the business of the organization that has value to it, in terms of it business 
model and is necessary for achieving its objectives, and IS asset that has value to the 
organization and necessary for achieving its objectives and supporting business assets. The 
security needs of business assets characterized with the help of security criterion, such as 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
The second group is risk-related concept. Risk is a combination of a threat with one or more 
vulnerabilities leading to a negative impact that harms one or more assets. In this definition 
impact means a potential negative consequence of a risk that harms assets of an organization, 
when a threat, potential attack that can lead to harm, is accomplished. Threat exploits the 
vulnerabilities that characterize the weakness of the IS asset. A combination of a threat and 
one or more vulnerabilities leads to impact. A threat agent is an agent who has means to 
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harm intentionally IS assets. An attack method is a standard means by which a threat agent 
executes threat. 
The third group is risk-treatment related concepts. Risk treatment is a decision to treat the 
identified risks. It satisfies a security need. Categories of risk treatment decision include: risk 
avoidance – decision not to become involved in, or to withdraw from, a risk; risk reduction – 
action to lessen the probability or/and negative consequences, associated with a risk; risk 
transfer – decision to share the burden of loss from a risk with another party; risk retention – 
accepting the burden of loss from a risk. The condition over the phenomena of the 
environment that we wish to make true by installing the IS, in order to mitigate risks is called 
security requirement. This is implemented by a designed means to improve security, 
specified by a security requirement, and implemented to comply with it. A control designates 
a means to improve the security by implementing the security requirements. 
 
Figure 1. The ISSRM domain model; adapted from (Dubois et al., 2010) 
2.3 The ISSRM process 
The ISSRM process (see Figure 2) describes the activities needed to identify, monitor and 
control security risk. Within the process, a risk is defined as any future events that may 
prevent one meet the team’s goals. A process allows you to identify risk, quantify the impact 
and take actions to prevent it from occurring or reducing the eventual impact. The first step is 
dedicated to context and asset identification, it starts with analysis of the organization, its 
environment and assets that need protection. Then it goes the determination of security 
objectives (e.g., integrity, confidentiality or availability). Third step is risk analysis and 
assessment. The purpose is to identify and estimate risks qualitatively or quantitatively. 
Risk treatment is an activity of selecting and implementing measures to modify the risk. Risk 
treatment includes as its major element, risk control/mitigation, but also extends further to, 
for example, risk avoidance, risk transfer, risk financing, etc. The next step is to define 
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security requirements, i.e. the security solutions to mitigate the risks. Finally, it is necessary 
to select and implement the countermeasures/controls within the organization.  
 
Figure 2. ISSRM process, adapted from (Matulevičius et al., 2008a) 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter we presented basic definitions of the ISSRM approach, its domain model and 
the process of risk management. We also defined the scope of ISSRM application, where we 
are focusing only on security risk management. With the help of conceptual model we 
present three principal groups of concepts of ISSRM: asset-related concepts, risk-related 
concepts and risk-treatment related concepts. The ISSRM process represents steps to be 
taken to manage the security risks. This process includes context and asset identification, 
determination of security objectives, risk analysis and assessment, risk treatment, security 
requirements engineering and implementation of selected control measures.  
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Chapter 3. Business Process Modelling Notation 
Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) is a language for constructing business 
process models (White, 2004). It considered to be business-friendly, because it is based on 
notions familiar from traditional flowcharting. At the same time, the notations are linked to a 
semantic model, which means that each shape used in the notation has a specific meaning, 
with defined rules and connections between objects. The key element of BPMN application is 
the Business Process Diagram. It is constructed of a set of graphical elements that were 
chosen to be distinguishable from each other and to utilize shapes that are familiar to most 
modellers. It describes a typical order of activities and what role or organizational unit 
performs or is responsible for the process.  
As a part of pedagogical approach the use of BPMN is classified to three levels, based on 
how the model is used (Silver, 2009). Descriptive modelling describes the typical order of 
activities and what role or organizational unit each one performs, or responsible for. 
Analytical modelling describes the activity flow precisely, including the exception paths 
significant to key performance indicators. Executable modelling targeted to the system 
developing, not business architecture or analysis. The scope of this work is Descriptive 
modelling, which is the first level of BPMN. It basically concentrates on business-oriented 
process mapping by simply documenting what the flow is. 
3.1 Introduction to BPMN through example 
Figure 4 represents an order making, execution, and product delivery process in the Internet 
store. This process begins with order making by user that means choosing the product and 
paying the bill. To clear the situation this two actions are included in the meaning of Product 
order.  
There are four participants involved in the communication, they are represented with a help 
of lanes: User, Internet store, Factory and Bank. We can also notice that the Internet Store, a 
pool, which is the main container of a process, is divided into three lanes: it is done in order 
to organize flow elements belonging to different store departments. The process begins with a 
message, which triggers a start event Request for product and the first task Receive request. 
The next task is identification of a user (see the BPMN task Identify user), which requires the 
connection with the Database, checking the necessary information: if the user is not 
identified, the process is leaded to the end event with a sign of terminal signal inside, which 
doesn’t mean the end of parent process, but the end of sub-process. The second path is the 
sequence flow with the confirmation of User’s successful identification (see the BPMN 
gateway Identified?), continues with the order entering into the system (see task Enter order), 
and it is the point where main process flow forks into two parallel going sub-processes: 
checking the product availability and the finance control. The system checks the product 
availability in-store (see task Check product availability), if it is not available (see gateway In-
store available?), it offers User to order needed product from factory (see task Order from 
factory), sending a request for confirmation. This activity uses a message flow (see 
Confirmation request and Response), which helps to organize the communication between 
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participants. If the product is not in the store (see the BPMN gateway In-store available?), it 
is ordered from the factory (task Order from factory); otherwise the product is prepared for 
delivery (task Prepare product for delivery). In the second parallel the payment for the 
product is checked with the Bank. Both parallels are joined with a gateway, after which the 
order is closed and delivered (task Close and deliver) to the user. The process finishes with an 
end event (Success), which sends a message to the User (see BPMN data flow Deliver 
order). 
 
 
Legend: 
 
Figure 3. The BPMN example: the internet store 
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3.2 Major constructs and concepts 
The four basic categories of objects are flow objects, containers, flows and artefacts. The flow 
objects, used to describe the atomic units of a process, are events, tasks and gateways. An 
event indicates start or end of a process path; it can be triggered or non-triggered (it means 
an activity that executes or finishes the event; e.g. message, timer, error etc). A task is an 
atomic activity that has no internal sub-parts defined by the model. In some cases, task can 
also represent the sub-process, a compound activity with sub-parts then the task figure is 
labelled with a small plus on the bottom, which identifies collapsed process. The control of 
the divergence and convergence of sequence flow is realised by the gateways. The gateway 
determines traditional decisions, as well as forking, merging, and joining of paths. We can 
define some types of gateways. An exclusive gateway or XOR gateway represents an 
exclusive decision, which means only one of the output sequence flows to be followed, based 
on some condition; parallel gateway signifies a parallel split or AND-split, means that all of 
the outgoing sequence flows are to be followed in parallel, unconditionally.  
The BPMN containers are pools and lanes. They both play roles of object holders. However, 
the pool shows the message flow between the process and external participants. The lane is a 
subdivision of a process, used to organize flow elements belonging to different categories, 
also represent performer roles or organizational units.  
Relationships between different BPMN constructs are defined with flows, which include 
sequence flow, message flow and associations. The sequence flow links activities, gateways, 
and events within a single pool; it is represented by a solid line connector. The message flow 
is a dashed connector representing a signal sent between two pools. Association is used to 
associate data, text, and other artefacts with flow objects, represented with the help of dotted 
line connector.  
The last group of graphical objects in BP diagrams is artefacts. The BPMN artefacts contain 
concepts of data objects, which are defined as mechanism to show how data is required or 
produced by activities, data stores and annotations.  Data stores describe the way data could 
be stored. Annotations suggest mechanism to provide additional text information for the user 
of a BP Diagram. 
3.3 BPMN Meta-model 
Figures 3 and 4 represent the BPMN conceptual meta-model. Current model is realised with 
the help of UML class diagram. It brings together major BPMN concepts, relations and 
classification, according to previous paragraph. Figure 4 defines four groups of graphical 
objects. The construction of BP Diagram begins with defining process participants, it 
influence on decision of how many pools should be used. The pool can be divided into lanes 
or not, if decided to classify the process part accordingly to some rules, pool becomes filled 
with lanes, if not – then pool is the only container of a process. The model shows that every 
lane itself can be divided into more lanes, if necessary. Containers are a group represented by 
pools and lanes; group contains flow objects: tasks; defined as sub-process or not, gateways; 
of any data type and also labelled or not, and events; start, end or intermediate and triggered 
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or not. The flow objects and artefacts has different type of connection within the groups and 
between each other, these relations are represented in Figure 5. It shows that flow objects are 
connected with sequence flow. Connection between artefact and tasks is realised with data 
association flow. Tasks and events can be connected to pools with data flow. We can notice 
that some connection lines are marked with 'to' and 'from' pointers, which mean that flows go 
into and from the object. It is also marked how many connections different elements can 
have. 
 
Figure 4. Extract of BPMN Meta-model: Concept classification 
 
 
Figure 5. Extract of BPMN Meta-model: Relationships 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter is dedicated to Business Process Modelling Notation, language for constructing 
business process models. We defined the scope of analysis, concentrating on Descriptive 
models, the first level of BPMN modelling. We made the short introduction to BPMN using 
example, created with BPMN version 2.0, which represents the main activities in the Internet 
store: order making, order execution, product delivery. In paragraph 3.2 we collected together 
major BPMN concepts and constructs. The connections and relationships between them are 
represented in the Figures 4 and 5, in BPMN meta-model. 
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Chapter 4. Analysis 
In this section we will consider how the BPMN language could be applied according to the 
ISSRM process. More specifically we will follow the six steps of the ISSRM process to 
investigate security risks in the online registration process at the Internet store. 
4.1 Context and asset identification.  
Let’s consider the following situation where the potential user (presented as the BPMN pool 
User) wishes to start using the Internet store system (see the BPMN pool System). In order to 
get details of the registration, user sends a message with an inquiry to the system 
administrator. The process of the message handling is presented in Figure 6. Here the system 
accepts the message (see task Accept message), the message is read by the system 
administrator (see task Read message) and the explanations (see data flow Demand for 
registration) are sent (see task Send answer) back to the user.  
 
Figure 6. Message handling process 
In Figure 7 we present the user registration process. Here, after receiving the instructions, the 
user registers to the Internet store system by submitting his data (see data flow User info). The 
system, then, accepts registration information (which includes user data on the preferred 
Username and Password) and includes it into the database (see task Insert data to DB). After 
having the valid username and password, the user is able to login to Internet store system as 
illustrated in Figure 8. Hence the system, first, checks the username existence, and, then, the 
password (see task Checks password). If these data matches, the user gets the “Success” 
signal and is able to use the Internet store system. Otherwise he gets a notification about the 
failure (see data flow No such user or password). 
After having the valid username and password, the user is able to login to Internet store 
system as illustrated in Figure 8. Hence the system, first, checks the username existence, and, 
then, the password (see task Checks password). If these data matches, the user gets the 
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“Success” signal and is able to use the Internet store system. Otherwise he gets a notification 
about the failure (see data flow No such user or password). 
 
Figure 7. User registration process 
 
Figure 8. User login process 
4.2 Determination of security objectives 
In this scenario we can identify few major assets that need protection against security risks. 
Firstly, we need to ensure confidentiality of username and password. If confidentiality is 
revealed the system violators could use the user’s personal data for not intended goals. In 
addition we need to ensure integrity of all the business processes (e.g., including the ones 
described in Figures 6, 7 and 8) needs to be ensured. If integrity is broken the system might 
be used not according to its purpose.  
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Figure 9. Message handling process including security risk attack 
4.3 Risk analysis and assessment 
In Figure 9 we model a potential security risk scenario. Let’s say, that there exists a violator 
(presented as the BPMN pool Violator) who would like to login to the system without 
registering the personal user account. Similarly as illustrated in Figure 6, the violator sends a 
message to the system. However this time, the message includes a spy program (see the data 
flow Message containing a spy program in Figure 9), which is started after the message is 
accepted (see task Accept message) and read (see task Read message). The spy program 
starts a new task (see task Extract data from DB), which sends an inquiry to the database and 
extracts the username and password. These data are then attached to a reply message, which 
is sent to the violator (e.g., see task Sends an answer, and data flow Demand for registration). 
In this analysis we are able to identify the ISSRM threat agent (e.g., Violator) and the ISSRM 
attack method (e.g., Message containing a spy program and Extraction of data from the 
database). Combination of these elements forms a security threat. The direct impact of this 
threat is that the confidentiality of the username and password is broken. On the other, this 
impact provokes other impact, which negates the integrity of the business processes; i.e., the 
Violator is able to access the system without registering to it, and, thus, change the business 
processes according to his needs.  
4.4 Risk treatment  
Risk treatment involves deciding how the identified security flow is mitigated. In our 
example we will take a risk reduction – i.e., actions to lessen the probability of the negative 
consequences – decision.  
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Figure 10. Message handling process including security requirements 
4.5 Security requirements definition 
To reduce the probability of accepting the message, which contains a spy program, firstly, we 
introduce a task for Message scanning, as defined in Figure 10. If this message is not secure, 
it deleted and the sender is blocked (see task Block user/Delete message). Secondly, we 
introduce the task to Control activity of DB access. If during the message handling process 
there exist a try to access the Database, this should be blocked (see task Block DB access). 
Finally the last countermeasure is introduced with a task Outcoming traffic control. This task 
controls if the response message is of the same length as it was prepared by the administrator. 
If this control fails, the system stops the message sending (see task Stop the operation).  
4.6 Control implementation 
Application of the BPMN is typically performed at the analysis stages. Thus implementation 
of the security requirements remains postponed. On the other hand the iteration of the ISSRM 
process is needed where the current processes, such as one presented in Figure 10 would be 
considered for the new security risks.  
4.7 Summary 
In this Chapter we have performed an analysis of how BPMN can be applied to ISSRM 
process according to its six steps. We identified context and assets that has any value to the 
system described in running example, determinate security objectives. We also analysed and 
made an assessment of risk with the help of created potential security risk scenario. 
Moreover, we made decision about risk treatment method and according to that we defined 
the security requirements and opportunity of control implementation.    
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Chapter 5. Mapping 
The analysis of adaption the BPMN language to ISSRM is realised with the semantic 
alignment between this two approaches. In examples, which are illustrated in Figures 6  to 10, 
we represent the use of BPMN with respect to possible attack scenarios, implemented 
controls and security requirements to protect the system from these attacks. The results of the 
analysis are summarized in Table 1, which gives us an overview of opportunity to match 
ISSRM concepts, listed in the first column, with BPMN elements, adduced in the second 
column, providing decisions with required examples. 
Table 1. Alignment between the ISSRM and BPMN 
The ISSRM  
domain model 
BPMN constructs Example 
A
ss
et
-r
e
la
te
d
 
co
n
ce
p
ts
 
Asset - - 
Business 
asset 
Data object;  
Task, Gateway, Event, Sequence 
flow 
Username and Password; 
Processes described in Figures 6, 7, and 8 
IS asset Data store 
Pool, Lane 
Database; 
System, Database connection, Message 
Security 
criterion 
- Confidentiality of Usernames and Password; 
Integrity of processes described in Figures 6, 7, 
and 8 
R
is
k
-r
e
la
te
d
  
co
n
ce
p
ts
 
Risk - - 
Impact  Confidentiality of Usernames and Password is 
broken; Integrity of processes (e.g., Figures 6, 7, 
and 8) is negated 
Event - - 
Threat - A violator sends a message containing a spy 
program, which extract info from database and 
sends it back to the violator. 
Vulnerability - Message is being handled without any scanning; 
The outgoing traffic is not monitored; 
The access to database is not controlled 
Threat agent Pool Violator 
Attack 
method 
Task; 
Flows (e.g., Data flow with the 
label describing attack method; 
Data association flow with the 
label describing attack method); 
Extract info from database;  
Data flow Message containing a spy program; 
Data association flows Sends a request and Gets 
data 
R
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re
a
tm
en
t 
re
la
te
d
  
co
n
ce
p
ts
 
Risk 
treatment 
- Reduction (but other decision are also possible) 
Security 
requirement 
Task,  
 
 
Gateway,  
Event,  
 
Sequence  flow 
Tasks Message scanning; Block user/Delete 
message; Control activity of DB access; Block DB 
access; Stop operation; Outgoing traffic control 
Gateways Safe?; Access to DB?; Traffic ok? 
Events Message deleted; Access forbidden; 
Operation stopped 
Control - - 
5.2 Asset-related concepts 
Asset-related concepts concentrate on assets, that need to be protected and security criteria, 
describing asset security. We defined that in BPMN the role of asset can be played by data 
object, data association flow, also tasks, which are used to model business assets. The IS 
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asset is a BPMN data store; it contains information valuable for the system. From the Figure 
6 we can define the example of IS asset – it is a Database, the business assets are 
username/password that Database contains. Association between tasks Accept registration 
signal, Insert data to Database and Data object Username/Password in Figure 7 also 
represent the valuable assets of the system with respect to ISSRM domain model. The 
business asset is defined as information or process that has value to organisation. 
Accordingly, we can make a parallel in definitions of an ISSRM business asset and the 
concept of BPMN association; the association represents the process flow that associates 
data with other flow objects. 
We defined two security criteria, which characterize security needs of assets in our example: 
confidentiality of usernames and passwords, stored in the database. And from other point 
we can also talk about integrity of business process diagrams.  
5.3 Risk-related concepts   
Risk related concepts define the risk itself and the major risk assessments. The result of 
mapping shows that it can be realised only partially, so we can’t define risks or event with 
respect to basic BPMN constructs and concepts. The security criteria, defined earlier, leads to 
identification of a threat; data confidentiality can be injured, and also the integrity of figures 
can be harmed. The vulnerabilities of the system are the following; message is being handled 
without any scanning and the work with it starts immediately after receiving, the outcome 
traffic of the system is not checked, and check of database access is not performed.  
The threat agent is defined with the help of a pool element in Figure 9, called Violator.  The 
pool represents any kind of communication between process participants, so it is the only 
element that can identify person or participant. The attacker carries an attack method, a 
combination of BPMN task, data flow and data association flow: from our example we can 
define task Extract info from database with data association flow to Database element. The 
impact negates the security criteria and compromises the confidentiality of above mentioned 
assets. Using stolen username and password violator illegally gets to the system and can use 
system services with the rights of a normal user. 
5.4 Risk treatment-related concepts 
The risk treatment describes the decisions that should be taken and controls to be 
implemented in order to mitigate risks, described earlier. For risk treatment decision we 
choose risk avoidance; it means that it is more valuable to implement controls that will help 
to keep system secure and to evade the impact. Security requirements are represented as a 
combination of BPMN tasks, gateways, sequence flows and event. One of the examples of 
security requirements is a process of message scanning in Figure 10; it starts with task 
Message scanning, followed by the conditional control realised by the gateway Secure?, and 
then it assumes making of decision to Block user/Delete message, the event Message 
deleted shows the result of the security requirement implementation. All these elements are 
connected with a sequence flow. 
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5.5 Summary 
This chapter makes an overview of mapping the BPMN to ISSRM with respect to security 
risk analysis. We analysed how BPMN can be applied in order to follow the risk management 
process. The Table 1 brings the result of our analysis; it introduces the major ISSRM 
concepts, the synonyms of these concepts in BPMN approach and provides the examples of 
BMN language use. The analysis shows that mapping can be realised partially; great part of 
elements can be represented in BPMN, but they can be described according to the problem 
context. 
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Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this work we have performed an analysis of the BPMN approach following the ISSRM 
domain model. Our major contribution is the semantic alignment of the BPMN constructs to 
the ISSRM concepts. In this chapter we discuss the validity threats, conclude the study with 
the potential extensions and improvements of the BPMN approach towards security risk 
management and also present the related and future work. 
6.1 Threats to validity 
The following threats to the validity of this study have been identified. Firstly, our results 
contain a certain degree of subjectivity. On the one hand, only two researchers have 
performed this study. Thus, it might mean that some aspects of the BPMN approach or its 
application could be interpreted and aligned to the ISSRM concepts differently. On the other 
hand, the running example also involves the subjective decisions on how to model the 
selected problem. For instance, in Figure 10 we have selected to take the risk reduction 
decision. However, the security requirements would be different if one would take the risk 
avoidance (or other) decision. Secondly, the scope of the current work is limited to the 
BPMN descriptive modelling. We acknowledge the importance to investigate the analytical 
and executable modelling, but this remains for the future research. Finally, in this work we 
analyse only a simple example of the Internet store. Although this example is realistic, we 
have not applied it in the practical settings. Thus, our analysis remains based on the selected 
BPMN literature (Remco et al., 2007; Seel et.al, 2005; White, 2004). 
6.2 Potential improvements 
During the example modelling process we faced some difficulties in using BPMN with a 
focus to security. The contribution of our analysis suggests improvements for BPMN in the 
context of security risk management activities: 
Only part of ISSRM concepts can be realized with the help of BPMN; for example the major 
part of risk-related concepts of ISSRM cannot be represented with the help of BPMN 
structures. Some elements for BPMN are also missing in risk-treatment related concepts’ 
group, such as Risk treatment or Control, and asset-related concepts’ group, concepts like 
Security criteria. The only opportunity to describe these concepts is to add extra information 
textually with the help of text annotations for example. Solution for this problem is to provide 
the BPMN language with new additional constructs to cover all the concepts described by 
ISSRM. That means to extend the abstract and concrete syntax, and semantics of the 
language. 
The same constructs used for different ISSRM concepts. For example in Table 1 we can 
notice that the BPMN task is used to describe a business asset, an attack method and also 
security criteria, which can create conflicts in understanding and reading figures. However, 
the BPMN approach encourage using labels, this problem can be solved in this way: we can 
label tasks describing different types of ISSRM concepts with different labels, to mark if task 
is used to determine attack method or security requirement. Nowadays there exist a great 
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variety of BPMN modelling tools, and most of them allowed using different colours while 
drawing models, so risk-related concepts can be marked with red colour for example, risk-
treatment related – with blue (see Figures 8 and 9). Extended language structures will solve 
this problem too. 
The guidelines of how exactly to use BPMN elements for different purposes are not defined; 
in the process of analysis we faced with a problem when one ISSRM concept can be 
represented with many BPMN constructs; for example security requirements in Figure 9 can 
be modelled with tasks, gateways, and events. These constructs can be used in group or 
separately; for example gateway Secure? Can be used without task Message scanning, it 
brings the same point – the control of a process flow. This makes a mess around the 
modelling process, because no strict rules exist about using one or another element. It can be 
helpful to define the rules that distinguish how to use different element while modelling 
system security. It will make understanding of business diagrams easier and modelling - more 
specified. 
6.3 Related work 
In the literature we found few studies on the extension of the business process modelling 
languages towards security. For instance Sindre introduces an extension of the UML activity 
diagrams, called mal-activities (Sindre, 2007). Gaaloul et al. present a model to ensure 
integrity, confidentiality and availability when tasks are delegated among business actors 
(Gaaloul et al., 2008). In the work of Backes et al. security requirements (expressed through 
the cryptographic primitives) are incorporated in the development of the business processes. 
The limitations of these works are that they focus either on a coarse-grained level, or target 
only some specific security aspects (e.g., security requirements) in business processes 
(Backes et al., 2003)  
Rodriguez et al. propose the BPMN extensions for modelling secure business processes 
through understanding the security requirements. Firstly, their proposal illustrates the 
extension of the BPMN abstract syntax with the security-related concepts such as non-
reputation, attack harm detection, integrity, privacy, access control, security role and 
security permission. Secondly, the concrete BPMN syntax is extended through the 
stereotypes introduced to the ordinary constructs of BPMN. The study does not include any 
consideration of the extension semantics. In comparison to the work of Rodriguez et al. in 
this work we do not propose any concrete extensions of the BPMN. However, we present a 
semantically grounded analysis based on the well-established domain model for the IS 
security risk management (Dubois et al., 2010; Mayer, 2009). This allows us (i) to understand 
current BPMN means to deal with security-related problems; (ii) to identify the potential 
BPMN extensions towards security analysis both at the (concrete and abstract) syntax level 
and at the security-oriented semantics level. 
6.4 Future work 
The major task of our future work remains the performance of validity test. One opportunity 
to validate our analysis results is to create an illustrative example with proposed 
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improvements in BPMN – to realise a performance test. That will show if proposed 
improvements allow using language in earlier mentioned directions with respect to security 
and risk management. On the other hand, to achieve more objective view, more people can be 
involved in validation process to conduct usability testing; providing participants with ability 
for using improved syntax and language semantics, ask them to create an example. That 
practise will discover if the language mapping and proposed improvements are available and 
understandable for users and are easy to use in practise. For efficiency testing, we can 
compare BPMN with other approaches in order to find out if it proposes a reasonable and 
worth method to model business process security. By reason of scope limitations, we 
addressed our analysis only for the first level of BPMN modelling – descriptive modelling. 
But we also acknowledge the importance to investigate two other level - the analytical and 
executable modelling, so this remains for the future research. On the other hand, our 
contribution should be also understood in a broader sense. For instance, in some cases 
application of the BPMN security extensions would not be applicable because of the 
language nature to model organisation’s business processes, i.e., leading to the weak 
expressive power to address security concerns. This would result in translation of the BPMN 
model to the security modelling languages, such as Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et al., 
2008b) or misuse case (Matulevičius et al., 2008a). Such a model translation would be 
supported by transformation rules, developed on the semantic alignment of the (business and 
security) modelling approaches to the common base, i.e., the ISSRM domain model. 
However, definition of the transformation rules remains a future work. 
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Süsteemide turvalisuse arendamine kasutades 
äriprotsesside modelleerimist 
 
Resümee 
 
Äriprotsesside arusaam ja modeleerimine on üks olulisematest aspektidest iga tänapäevase 
süsteemi arendamisel. Infosüsteemide modeleerimise jaoks on loodud erinevad käsitlused 
ning üks nendest on äriprotsesside modeleerimisnotatsioon. BPMN aitab äriprotsesse 
kirjeldama, modelleerima ja optimeerima, kuid väiksemal määral aitab arusaama kuidas saab 
selle käsitluse raames juhtida äriprotsesside turvalisust ning analüüüsida infosüsteemi 
turvariske. See aspekt muutub kaasaegsetes infosüsteemides veel komplitseeritumaks kuna 
turvatud süsteemi loomiseks peavad nii äriprotsessid kui ka turvalisuse  küsimused olema 
vaadeldud parallellselt - koostoimes. Selle uurimistöö eesmärgiks on analüüsida BPMN ja 
infosüsteemi turvariskide juhtimise vastastikus kaasmõju. BPMN’i võtmeaspektide 
väljaselgitamiseks ja antud modelleri turvanäitajate, riskide ja riskide juhtimise aru saamiseks 
antud töös on rakendatud struktureeritud lähenemine. Töös uuritakse kuidas modeller saab 
BPMN’i abil väljundada turvatud süsteemi komponente, riske või riskide juhtimist. Töös 
ühtlustatakse BPMN keele põhikonstruktsioonid ISSRM mudeli kontseptiga. Antud 
uurimistöös BPMN-i käsitluse rakendatavus  on vaadeldatud interneti kaupluse näitel.  
Meie uurimistöö pakkub infosüsteemi analüütikule või arhitektile võimalust mõistma 
äriprotsesse ja turvakomponente ühe modeleerimiskeele abil, ja analüüs on tehtud ainult 
esimesel keele tasemel vaadeldes Descriptive modelling. Sellega avatakse ka uurijal võimalus 
tulevikus tuua paralelle erinevate modeleerimise keelte vahel et uurida ISSRM perekonda 
kuuluvate mudelite loomises patterne.  
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